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Grid Pricing: An Empirical Investigation of Market Signal Clarity. 
ABSTRACT 
The ability of the grid marketing system for fed cattle to provide an efficient price 
transmission mechanism is investigated. Nerlove' s (1958) adaptive expectations 
approach is adopted to model the relationship between grid premiums (discounts) and the 
weekly relative supply of carcass quality attributes. Linear regression techniques are used 
to estimate Nerlove's supply response function. Granger Causality tests are conducted to 
investigate the relationship between grid premiums (discounts) and the relative supply of 
carcass quality attributes. Regression estimates and the Granger Causality tests provide 
empirical support for the 2005 National Beef Quality Audit call for clearer market 
signals. 
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Grid Pricing: An Empirical Investigation of Market Signal Clarity. 
Introduction 
The commercial introduction of grid pricing as a marketing alternative for fed 
cattle started in the mid-l 990s. The objective of this pricing mechanism is to discover 
carcass value consistent with the philosophy of a value based marketing system (Cross 
and Savell 1994). An important advantage of selling on a grid for producers is detailed 
carcass data on animals marketed. The general consensus among beef industry marketing 
experts is that the combination of carcass quality information and premiums should 
motivate producers to improve carcass quality and reduce carcass quality variability over 
time. 
The issue of inconsistent beef carcass quality was formally investigated by the 
beef industry's Value Based Marketing Task force (VBMTF) 1990. Selling cattle by the 
pen, at an average price, was linked to beef quality issues in that report (Cross and Savell 
1994). The 2005 National Beef Quality Audit (2005 NBQA), conducted by the National 
Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), indicates the industry is still struggling with the 
quality and marketing issues highlighted in the 1990 VBMTF report. The 2005 NBQA 
report provides a list of recurring issues that continue to confront the industry: a) excess 
fat production, b) inconsistent meat quality, c) the need for clearer market signals, and d) 
inconsistent carcass quality. 
The survey findings presented in 2005 NBQA report indicates that additional 
research is needed on the price transmission mechanism for fed cattle. The grid 
marketing channel has become an important marketing alternative for fed cattle 
producers. The capacity of the grid pricing system to transmit consistent carcass quality 
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price signals through the fed cattle marketing channel is germane to the market signal 
clarity issue raised in the NBQA report. 
The research question addressed here is: To determine if there is evidence of a 
lack of market signal clarity in the grid price transmission mechanism. Economic price 
theory states that the price and quantity of any scarce good are related. The approach we 
have adopted to answer this question is based on the adaptive price expectations work of 
Nerlove (1958). We formalize the relationship between a grid premium (discount) and 
the weekly proportional slaughter volume (relative supply) of the associated carcass 
quality attribute by adopting an adaptive expectations single commodity market model. 
Empirical testing of hypothesized relationships employs Granger Causality and 
the empirical estimation of Nerlove's supply response function. Thus, the clarity issue is 
addressed by evaluating the relationship between publically reported weekly grid 
premiums and discounts for specific carcass characteristics and the percentage of those 
characteristics reflected in total weekly slaughter volume (i.e., the relative supply of the 
carcass attribute). 
The Impetus for Grid Pricing 
The competitive position of beef within the red meat industry has struggled for 
decades. As a consequence, beef demand experienced a sharp decline from 1979 to 
1998, recovered moderately, and then continued its decline beginning in 2005 (Mintert 
2009). The literature on beef marketing issues ( e.g., Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner 1998) has 
suggested that the decline in beef demand is primarily a consequence of: a) price 
competition from poultry and pork, b) changing consumer preference for meat products, 
and c) inconsistent production quality of beef cattle. 
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A proposed solution to declining demand discussed in the literature is for the beef 
industry to embrace the concept of value based marketing. The VBMTF provided 
recommendations for transforming the beef production and marketing systems in 
accordance with value based marketing principles. Eight consensus points addressing 
weaknesses along the entire beef supply chain were outlined in the NCBA document: 
WAR ON FAT (VBMTF, 1990). Specifically, reform of the fed cattle marketing system 
was recommended in consensus point 7: "Fed cattle should be valued on an individual 
carcass basis rather than an average price basis." The economic issues associated with 
average pricing of slaughter cattle have been widely discussed in the academic literature 
(e.g., Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1993). 
Prototype pricing mechanisms that expanded carcass premiums and discounts 
beyond the traditional "Grade & Yield" individual carcass pricing system began to appear 
in the early 1990s ( Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1993). Today, these type of individual 
carcass quality based pricing mechanisms are generally referred to as a "grid pricing" 
mechanisms. Consensus point 7 and the increase in the market share of grid sales (Muth 
et al. 2007) indicates that the beef industry has recognized the need for a pricing 
mechanism that engenders transparency, and allows the market to differentiate between 
desirable and undesirable beef carcass traits. 
Public Reporting of Grid Premium and Discount Price Signals 
Weekly published grid premium and discount reports iliational Carcass 
Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers) are provided to the public by 
the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The AMS began publishing grid 
price reports in October 1996. The report reflects an additive grid pricing mechanism. 
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The AMS designed the weekly reporting mechanism to reflect industry standards. The 
price data collected on grid sales of fed cattle include: a) heavy and light weight carcass 
discounts, b) yield-grade and quality-grade premiums and discounts, and c) discounts for 
carcass defects, such as injection lesions, dark cutters, etc. (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner, 
1998). 
From 1996 to 2001, the beef packing industry provided grid premium and 
discount weekly data on voluntarily basis. The U.S. Congress passed the Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting Act (MPR) in 1999, and this act was implemented in April, 2001. 
MPR regulations require firms in the meat packing industry to report grid premium and 
discount transaction information to the AMS on a weekly basis. 1 
The Economics of Grid Pricing 
The grid pricing literature includes numerous comparison studies using carcass 
data to evaluate the profitability of selling cattle on a grid versus average pricing 
mechanisms (e.g., Anderson and Zeuli 2001, Fausti and Qasmi 2002, McDonald and 
Schroeder 2003 , Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006). The general conclusion that can be 
drawn from this literature is that relative profit (revenue) levels depend on the level of 
carcass quality when fed cattle are sold on a grid. However, grid pricing incurs higher 
profit (revenue) variability relative to average pricing regardless of carcass quality. 
The literature has also explored the issue of whether grid premium signals are 
robust enough to persuade producers to sell on a grid. Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner (1998) 
contend that seller risk aversion may act as a barrier to adoption. Johnson and Ward 
(2005) report that grid pricing mechanisms are sending the correct signal, but they 
indicate that the grid premium signal appears to be too weak to af ect a change in overall 
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product quality. Weak premium incentives may act as a barrier to the adoption of grid 
pricing because sellers have the ability to sell cattle by the pen at an average price if they 
perceive that grid premium incentives are less than grid discount risks (Feuz, Fausti, and 
Wagner 1995; Fausti and Feuz 1995, Anderson and Zeuli 2001). White et al. (2007) 
demonstrates that producers of feeder cattle may face a market disincentive to retain 
ownership of feeder cattle and market on a grid due to the pricing structure of fed cattle 
grids. This particular research finding is disconcerting because it implies that the grid 
pricing system is not transmitting market signals back to feeder cattle producers. 
Finally, Feuz (1999) discusses the practice of large packing firms adjusting their 
grid premium and discount schedules based on plant averages. The implication is that 
grid premiums and discounts not only vary across firms but can also vary across plants 
within a firm. The heterogeneous nature of grid pricing mechanisms within the industry 
may be contributing to the reported finding in the 2005 NBQA that the fed cattle 
marketing system is still not providing "clear market signals." The market signal clarity 
issue raised in the NBQA report is consistent with recently reported empirical evidence 
that grid market share of weekly slaughter has increased significantly since the late 1990s 
(Schroeder et al. 2002, Muth et al. 2007), but average quality has not (2005 NBQA). 
Hypothesized Grid Price Transmission Mechanism 
Agricultural supply response functions are commonly defined in terms of a lagged 
production response to a change in market price. The nature of agricultural production 
lends itself naturally to this supposition because of the time lag between production 
decisions and harvest (crop or livestock). The literature on lagged agricultural supply 
response functions is extensive. Comprehensive literature discussions can be found in 
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Shonkwiler (1982) and Askari and Cummings (1977). Askari and Cummings review the 
supply response literature with respect to empirical studies on agricultural supply 
response that have evolved from the seminal work of Nerlove ( 1958) on the role of 
adaptive expectations in agriculture supply response functions. The production of 
slaughter cattle is consistent with the concept of a lagged supply response to price 
changes.2 
In the case of slaughter cattle, assume a typical feedlot firm purchases feeder 
cattle based on: a) perceived physical characteristics, b) genetic quality, c) the current 
price of fed cattle; d) expected input costs, and e) current and expected grid premiums 
and discounts. The firm expends resources to select feeder cattle that will produce a level 
of carcass quality at slaughter to maximize profit; given current and expected future 
market conditions. However, the quality of feeder cattle does vary due to seasonal 
patterns, pasture conditions, and cow herd management practices irrespective of genetic 
background. In addition, market conditions, primarily feed costs in conjunction with 
finished cattle prices also affect the firm's decision concerning carcass endpoint quality. 
Given this market environment, economic theory suggests that firms weigh the expected 
marginal benefit versus the expected marginal cost associated with attaining a specific 
level of carcass endpoint quality. 
Grid pricing mechanisms are hypothesized to be a type of competitive pricing 
system that has an intrinsic incentive mechanism that captures the market value of high 
quality carcass attributes that are not rewarded when cattle are sold by the pen and priced 
at the pen average. It is assumed that the market value captured by selling on a grid is the 
incentive that will increase grid market share of total slaughter. As more cattle are sold 
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on a grid, a larger proportion of firms will have adjusted production practices to meet 
carcass quality standards according to the price signals transmitted by grid pricing 
mechanisms. This, in turn, will improve average quality grade and yield grade of cattle 
marketed. Thus, the relative supply of superior quality grade and yield grade carcasses 
will increase, and the relative supply of inferior quality grade and yield grade carcasses 
will decline as a proportion of total slaughter. 
In this setting, the supply of a particular carcass quality attribute in the current 
marketing period (t) is assumed to be determined by the price of that quality attribute in 
the previous period (t-1 ). Nerlove's adaptive expectations supply response model is 
employed to analyze the relationship between a grid premium (discount) and the 
corresponding supply response for the production of a specific carcass quality attribute. 
The grid price transmission mechanism literature indicates that the supply 
response for the production of a specific carcass quality attribute to a change in price is 
determined with a lag. Equation 1 defines a simple linear supply and demand function, 
respectively. The supply function links quantity supplied ( Qn in period t to Nerlove's 
expected "normal" market price ( P ;). Nerlove (p. 231) frames his discussion of P; in 
terms of "adaptive price expectations." Parameters c and d are the intercept and slope 
coefficients, respectively. The demand function links quantity demanded (Qf) in period t 
to market price in period t (Pt ). Parameters a and b are the intercept and slope 
coefficients, respectively. 
Q:s - c I dP "' t T t · 
8 
Nerlove (pp. 231-232) demonstrates that an agricultural supply response function 
co:) which incorporates an adaptive price expectations mechanism (equation 2): 
is a function of past price and quantity ( equation 3 ). 
3 .. Q� = c/3 + dfJPt-1 + (1- /l)Q;_1 · 
Following Nerlove's approach, market short-run equilibrium is assumed across all 
· d . Qs _ Qd \ .. /" peno s. t-f - t-u v t O. Substituting the demand function (in equation 1) lagged 
by one period into the equation 3 provides us with a short-run equilibrium condition for 
quantity as follows: 
4. Q
r:
= (c - a)/3 +a+ [(d - b)/3 + b]P
r:
-i-
Equation 4 demonstrates that equilibrium quantity in period t is a function of price 
in period t-1. The relationship between quantity and price is determined by the structural 
coefficients of the supply and demand equations and p, which Nerlove defines as the 
"coefficient of expectations." Beta reflects the adaptive expectations mechanism. 
According to Nerlove, producers make production decisions in period t based upon 
"normal price (P;)". The outcome of producer production decisions is realized in period 
t+ 1. As defined by Nerlove, P; is an expected price that reflects the distribution of past 
prices plus a price prediction error component. Equation 2 demonstrates that P; is equal 
to the "normal price" in the previous period,(P;�1) plus a proportion (P) of the price 
prediction error in the previous period[Pt--l - P;_1]. 
The concept of a value based pricing system is theoretically consistent with 
Nerlove's adaptive expectations hypothesis. Empirical evidence of grid pricing 
mechanisms being effective conduits for the transmission of price signals to producers 
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should be revealed in the relationship between weekly market price and quantity across 
grid carcass quality categories. 
Two empirical methods will be used to evaluate the robustness of the grid price 
transmission mechanism across grid premium and discount categories: a) Linear 
regression techniques used to estimate Nerlove's supply response function as specified in 
equation 3 to evaluate changes in the relative supply of carcass attributes in response to 
changes in grid prices, and b) Granger Causality to evaluate the strength of the 
relationship between the grid premiums (discounts) and the relative weekly supply of a 
carcass attribute. These empirical procedures can help us ascertain if the producers are 
responding to grid premiums (discounts) signals and if the grid premiums (discounts) are 
conduits to bring the desired changes in cattle carcass quality. 
Data: 
Data was downloaded from the Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC). 
The LMIC obtained the data from a weekly AMS publication (USDA-AMS: the National 
Carcass Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers weekly report: 
LM_CT155). The data collected represents the post MPR period starting April 09, 2001 
through May 24, 2010 for quality grades (n= 477) and through March 3 1, 2008 for yield 
grades (n=3 65).3 There is empirical evidence that the pre MPR grid premium and 
discount reports may be bias (Fausti et al. 2008). Accordingly the pre MPR grid premium 
and discount data were not included in the analysis. Prior to April 2008 packers reported 
yield grade for 90% of weekly slaughter volume. Beginning in April of 2008 the 
percentage of weekly slaughter for which packers reported yield grade began to decline. 
By February 2009 the percentage of slaughter volume for which packers reported yield 
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grade dropped to 50% . Accordingly the yield grade data after March 3 1, 2008 were not 
included in the analysis. 
Specifically, grid premium and discount data were collected on national slaughter 
cattle grid premium and discount prices for the following quality grade categories (prime, 
choice/select discount, and standard), and two yield grade categories (YG 1-2 and YG4-
5). We decided to use the absolute value of discount price data to simplify the discussion 
of empirical results. 
Weekly carcass quality steer and heifer slaughter data reflects the percentage of 
carcasses grading prime, choice, select, standard, YGl -2, and YG4-5. The volume 
variables are labeled Primev, Choicev, Selectv, Standardv, YG 1-2v, and YG4-5v. This 
LMIC data corresponds to the National Steer & Heifer Estimated Grading Percent Report 
(AMS NW _LSI 96) published weekly by the USDA-AMS. The AMS NW _LS196 report 
provides information on the breakdown of quality and yield grade percentages for weekly 
national cattle slaughter for the respective carcass quality characteristics associated with 
grid premium and discount data.4 Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. 
Empirical Methodology: 
Nerlove "Supply Response" 
Nerlove's short-run supply response function (eq. 3 )  assumes quantity supplied in 
period t is dependent on price and quantity supplied in period t-1. The "Coefficient of 
Expectations (�)" captures producer reaction to unexpected changes in price; i.e., a 
deviation from the expected "normal" price. We use linear regression techniques to 
estimate equation 3 for each grid category discussed above: 
5. Qi = t + KPt-1 + ).Qi-1 + Ve: . 
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Where t = cf], K = d{3, and A = l f)J and the symbol Vr denotes the error term. We 
employ the Newey-West ( 1987) estimation procedure to generate a Heteroscedasticity I 
Autocorrelation (HAC) robust standard error to estimate the regression coefficients. 
We assume Q;_1 is a proxy capturing all exogenous factors affecting producer 
supply response. The adaptive expectations hypothesis suggests that Q:_1 also captures 
the distribution of past prices P t-i 't/ j > 1. The regression coefficient estimate "A-" will 
be used to derive an empirical estimate for p. The empirical estimate for P will provide a 
rough estimate of how quickly producers are adapting their price expectations to · 
unexpected price changes. 
The lagged price coefficient estimate "K" for each grid category represents the 
influence of last week's premium or discount on the relative supply of a specific carcass 
quality characteristic for the current week. We do not expect a substantial supply 
response from feedlot operators to changes in the previous week's premium and discount 
schedule. However, we do expect that feedlot operators would show some level of 
sensitivity to recent price information given that we expect marketing decisions to be 
made using profit maximizing criteria. Thus, we interpret a "k" as capturing a very short­
run supply response to a change in weekly grid premiums and discounts. 
Granger Causality 
The concept of causality within a time series framework was introduced by 
Granger ( 1969). Granger's empirical methodology is based on the concept that a 
"Granger Causal Relationship" exist if past values of Pt can be used to better predict 
current values of q1• If this is true, then this relationship is expressed as Pt "Granger 
Causes" qi, 
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There are several caveats associated with degree of statistical robustness when 
using Granger's empirical technique: a) for bilateral causality both random variables 
must be stationary or cointegrated, b) the selection of the appropriate lag length for the 
sampling period, and c) relevant variables which influence both Pt and q1 may be the 
source of the causal relationship between Pt and q/ 
Formally, it is hypothesized that the introduction of grid pricing for the purpose of 
changing production behavior over time can be empirically tested by estimating the 
Granger Causality relationship between weekly grid premiums and discounts (p1) and the 
relative supply of those carcass attributes (q,). There are three possible Granger Causality 
outcomes betweenp1 and q1: a) bidirectional causality, b) unidirectional causality, and c) 
Granger noncausality. 
Let us define the weekly price of a specific beef carcass trait as Pt, and weekly 
relative supply of a carcass trait as qt. The potential relationship between Pt and q1 is 
defined in equations 6 and 7. 'Ibe direction of Granger Causality is not assumed. Toward 
that end, a VAR (n) model is utilized: 
7. Pe -
The null hypothesis of Pt does not Granger cause qt can be specified as 
Q H1 • B - B - ··· - B - 0 u. Q• ;:,1 - · p:Z - - pn - ' 
and the null hypothesis of q e does not Granger cause Pt can be specified as 
The sensitivity caveat of the Granger test to lag length is addressed by adopting an 
optimal VAR lag length selection criteria rule that is based on AIC "goodness of fit" 
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statistic. The adoption of an optimal VAR lag length rule is consistent with the basic 
economic principle of profit maximization underlying producer supply response to 
changes in market price. The issue of stationarity is addressed using AIC criteria to 
select the appropriate lag length for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root (ADF) test 
(Wooldridge 2000: p.581). 
Empirical Results: 
Supply Response Estimates 
The regression estimates for the relative supply response function indicate that 
producer price expectation response (P) to a price change is very slow. Beta values range 
from 0.11 for Primev to 0.02 for YG4-5v (Table 2). Nerlove (1956: p. 501) commented 
on the magnitude of beta that " ... the closer is the coefficient of expectation to zero, that 
is, the greater the tenacity with which farmers cling to their previous expectations ...  " The 
estimated p values provide evidence that the cattle producers do cling to their previous 
expectations with great tenacity. 
Nerlove (1956: p. 501) suggests that p can be used to estimate the length of the 
distribution of past prices necessary before a new price signal will be acted upon to alter 
the producer's supply response. Assuming a producer has a threshold price (i\) above the 
expected normal price ( P :), the producer will alter his/her supply response if and only if 
he/she sees the (Pt � P;) for certain period of time. The adaptive expectations 
hypothesis assumes that producers will revise their expected price P; in proportion (P) to 
the level of their prediction error:Pt - P;. The length of the adjustment process (n) 
necessary to fully integrate the threshold price into expected normal price (P ;J can be 
estimated by evaluating the sum of the weights for "n" past prices: (1 - P) 11+ 1. 
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Following Nerlove, in Table 2, it is assumed that 95% of the prediction error has 
to be transmitted before a supply response is triggered:(1 {)) 11 +1 = 0.05. Accordingly, 
the estimated lag length for the transmission of a price signal to trigger a supply response 
ranges from 25 to 164 weeks (Table 2). These results show that producers are only 
responsive to a persistent market signals: i.e., the threshold price P
t 
must persevere in the 
market over long periods. The beef industry's  assertion of a lack of market signal clarity 
seems compatible with producer's requiring persistent market signals over a long period 
of time before any supply response occurs. In the absence of a persistent signal, 
producers may perceive the market signal to be vague, and may not alter their production 
plans until a persistent (clear) market signal is indentified. 
In accordance with Nerlove's adaptive expectations hypothesis, the lagged price 
supply response coefficient "K" is expected to be positive for premiums and negative for 
discounts. Empirical results indicate that none of the "K" coefficients are significant with 
the correct sign (Table 2). The "K" coefficient in the Primev regression is significant but 
has a negative sign, which is contradictory to the Nerlove's  adaptive supply response 
hypothesis. Nerlove's supply response suggests that higher premiums will be associated 
with a larger relative supply of cattle grading prime. Our estimate indicates that a higher 
premium level is associated with lower relative supply of prime carcasses. Similarly, the 
"K" coefficient for the Standard regression is significant but has positive sign, indicating 
that larger discounts are associated with increased relatively supply of fed cattle grading 
Standard. Nerlove's supply response hypothesis suggests that higher discounts will be 
associated with lower relative supply of cattle grading standard. 
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A plausible explanation for these contradictory results is that the supply of a 
particular carcass characteristic is fixed in the very-short run. This implies producers 
have no production flexibility in the very short-run. Therefore, in the very short-run, the 
market reacts to increases in quantity supplied with a decline in price. Market demand, in 
this case, determines the level of the carcass attribute 's premium or discount. If our 
explanation is correct, then this would imply that market demand for the prime and 
standard carcass attributes is relatively inelastic in the very short-run. 
Empirical estimates for "k" in the other four supply response equations find that 
"k" is statistically insignificant. This implies that for the carcass attributes; choice, select, 
YG 1 -2 ,  and YG4-5, feedlot operators production decisions in the very short-run, are not 
responsive to price. Again, this implies producers have no production flexibility in the 
very short-run. However, in this case, this would imply that the market response to an 
increase in the quantity supplied of carcass attributes choice, select, YG 1 -2 ,  and YG4-5 is 
very elastic in the very short-run. 
The empirical results for producer short run supply response to price suggest that 
fed cattle producers need market signals that are persistent because they lack production 
flexibility in the short-run. The market clarity issue raised in the 2005 NBQA report may 
be due to the lack of persistence in grid price signal levels. 
Granger Causality Estimates 
Six premium and discount categories were also subjected to Granger Causality 
tests analysis. ADF unit root tests for stationary were conducted using AIC criteria to 
select the lag length for the ADF procedure (Table 3). The unit root tests indicated that 
the volume series for Choicev, Selectv, Standardv, and YG4-5v have unit roots . 
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Similarly, price series for Prime and YG4-5 also have unit roots. The unit root issue was 
resolved by taking the first-difference of these non-stationary variables. The Granger 
Causality tests were conducted to determine if there is a Granger causal relationship 
between the volume or the first difference of the volume and the price or the first 
difference of the price. The results for the Granger Causality tests are summarized in 
Table 4. 
Grid pricing was introduced in order to facilitate discovery of carcass value 
consistent with the philosophy of a value based marketing system (Cross and Savell 
1994). As it was pointed out elsewhere, the general consensus among beef industry 
marketing experts is that the carcass quality information along with premiums and 
discounts should motivate producers to improve carcass quality and reduce carcass 
quality variability over time. If the market participants' behavior were consistent with 
the philosophy of value based marketing system and the beef industry marketing experts' 
expectations, then we would expect to reject HJ (i.e. p1 does not Granger causes q1) and 
accept HJ (i.e. q1 does not Granger causes pi). In other words, we would expect uni­
directional causality i.e. Pt Granger causes qr: . All of the tested series failed to confirm 
this uni-directional Granger relationship (Table 4). Two quality categories (Prime and 
Standard) show significant uni-directional causality but in the wrong direction, i .e. q1 
Granger causes p1• The other two quality categories (Choice and Standard) show highly 
significant bi-directional Granger causality, which implies price impacting the quantity at 
times, and quantity affecting the price at other times. This bi-directional Granger 
causality indicates the failure of the market to send consistent price signals. 
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In the case of yield grade categories, YG 1 has a significant uni-directional 
Granger relationship but in the wrong direction (i.e. q1 Granger causes p1),  as in the case 
of prime. The empirical analysis for yield grade category YG4-5 failed to find a 
significant Granger relationship in either direction. The Granger analysis re-enforce the 
empirical results reported for the grid supply response functions. 
The empirical results from Nerlove's supply response as well as Granger 
Causality analysis indicate that the grid pricing mechanism has not been able to transmit 
consistent and persistent signals that are necessary to encourage producers to alter 
production practices. These empirical findings re-enforce the concern raised in the 
literature that market signals transmitted by grid pricing mechanisms may be too weak to 
affect widespread change in the production behavior of fed cattle producers. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The general conclusion gleaned from our empirical findings is: while selling 
cattle on a grid does affect producer profit revenue and profit levels, it has not provided 
clear market signals that induce producer supply response to price across carcass quality 
attribute categories as envisioned by proponents of the value based marketing initiative 
for the fed cattle market. The lack of empirical evidence of grid premiums and discounts 
affecting the relative supply of quality grade and yield grade attributes in weekly 
slaughter volume over the 2001 to 2008 period covered in this study suggests that grid 
pricing signals to the market has not significantly affected producer supply response 
behavior. The lack of a supply response by producers suggests that the grid marketing 
mechanism has fallen short of the goals envisioned by the beef industry's value based 
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marketing initiative. Our study suggests that the 2005 National Beef Quality Audit 
(NCBA: 2006) call for clearer market signals is justified. 
One possible explanation for the lack of market signal clarity in the grid pricing 
system is that producer behavior during this period was influenced by the incentive to 
produce heavier cattle due to low corn prices and relatively high fed cattle prices. This 
implies that the market incentive targeting weight gain rather than carcass quality 
dominated the price transmission mechanism. Another explanation is that carcass quality 
uncertainty may have affected producer production and marketing decisions. Risk 
aversion is a plausible explanation for the low beta estimates reported. Targeting weight 
gain rather than carcass quality may have been viewed as the lower risk production and 
marketing strategy, given that producers have the option of selling slaughter cattle by the 
pen at an average price. Both of these suppositions are plausible explanations for the 
weakness in the grid price transmission mechanism empirically documented in this study. 
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Footnotes: 
1. The regulatory authority of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 
expired O ctober 1, 2005 due to a sunset clause. Regulatory authority resumed in 
July of 2008. For discussion of MPR and the legislative time line see Perry et al. 
2006, or Fausti et al. 2007. 
2. The empirical literature on agriculture supply response suggests that the adaptive 
expectations approach has greater explanatory power than other expectation 
modeling approaches, e.g., rational expectations (Shonkwiler 1982). 
3 .  The AMS stopped reporting the weekly percentage of individual yield grade 
volumes in February 2009. Therefore, it is no longer possible to look at the 
relationship between yield grade market share and yield grade premiums and 
discounts. 
4. Note that because yield grade categories YG2-3 and the YG3- 4 encompass 
73 .2% of weekly slaughter volume but provide relatively small premiums or 
discounts we are essentially calling them par categories during the sample 
period; therefore these series were not analyzed. The yield grade category 
YG> 5  is very highly correlated with the YG4- 5 category, and as a result we only 
included the YG4-5 category in our analysis. 
5. It should be noted that the lack of Granger Causality does not rule out a 
contemporaneous relationship between Pt and qt . 
6. We employed Spearman Correlation analysis (Newbold 1995) as measure of 
contemporaneous correlation. O nly the yield grade premium pair was found to 
have a statistically significant correlation coefficient (r= 0.3 8: P< 0.01) . All other 
correlation coefficients were below r= 0.10. However, correlation is not a 
sufficient condition for causality. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
No. of Standard 
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Price (Premium/Discount): 
Prime 477 7.979 2 . 1 00 3 .690 1 3 .950 
Choice/Select Discount 477 8.95 1 4.430 1 .220 24.870 
Standard 477 l 7.03 3 .086 1 1 .660 3 1 . 1 80 
YGl -2 365 2 .887 0 .299 l .890 4 .300 
YG4-5 365 1 3 . 1 82 0 .947 1 0.750 1 6. 500 
Volume: 
Primev 477 2 . 872 0.48 1 1 . 870 4.270 
Choicev 477 54.3 1 4  3 .45 1 48 .560 65 .43 0 
Selectv 477 34.896 2.985 25 .540 4 1 .300 
Standardv 477 7.9 1 8  1 .240 4 .7 1 0  1 1 .590 
YG I -2v 3 65 8 .549 l .246 5 .970 1 2 .350  
YG4-5v 3 65 6 .242 2 .550 l .5 1 0 1 1 .280 
Table 2. Grid Supply Response Estimates 
Estimates 1 
Price 
Dependent No. of Formation 
Variable Obs. K l @ (Weeks/ R2 
Primev 477 0 .370 -0.008· 0 .892** 0. 1 08 25  0 . 825  
(4.07) (- 1.63 )  (38 . 83 )  
Choicev 477 1 .6 1 2  0 .008 0 .969 ..  0 .03 1 94 0.926 
( 1 .77) (0.80) (6 1 .67) 
Selectv 477 1 .520 0 .004 0.955 .. 0 .046 64 0 .9 1 8  
(2.4 1 )  (0.38) (49.3 7) 
Standardv 477 -0.205 0 . 1 52* 0.9430** 0 .057 50 0 .905 
(-0 .36) (3 . 1 6) (44.08) 
YG 1 -2v 365  0 .527 0 .026 0.929 .. 0 .07 1 39  0 .877 
(2.55) (0.32) (45 .29) 
YG4-5v 365 -0. 1 l O 0.0 1 8  0.982 .. 0 .0 1 8  1 64 0 .98 1  
(-0.45) (0 .84) ( 1 06.6) 
1T statistics are provided in parenthesis below coefficient estimate, and a single asterisk (*), and 
double asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at 0 . 1 0, and 0.0 l level, respectively. 
2Estimate for the number of weeks required before 95% of a price signal is transmitted to producers. 
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Table 3 .  ADF Unit Root Test Results: Ho=Unit Root 1 

















477 - 1 .92 
477 -3 .02 
477 -3 . 89 
365 -4 .59 
365 - 1 . 5 1  
477 -4.05 
477 - 1 .40 
477 -3 . 04 
477 -2 .45 
365 -4. 59  




0.322 1 2  
0.034 1 2  
0.002 1 2  
0 .00 1 1 2  
0 .528 1 2  
0.00 1 8 
0 .584 1 2  
0 .032 4 
0 . 1 28 1 2  
0 .00 1 8 
0 .2 1 3  4 
'Statistical analysis was conducted using SAS (Version 9. 1 3 :  2007) and RATS (Version 7 :  
20 10). SAS generated P-Values based upon RA TS estimated Tau statistics. 
2Existence of unit root is rejected at a :S 0.05. 
Table 4. VAR (Optimal) Model: Direction of Granger Causality (a level = 0.05) 1 
qt% Pt % qt Granger Pt Granger Granger Causal 
(Volume) (Price) causes Pt causes qt Variable 
Primev dPrime Yes 
. 
No Uni-directional 










dStandardv Standard Yes 
. 
No Uni-directional 
YG 1 -2v YG l -2 Yes 
. 
No Uni-directional 
dYG4-5v dYG4-5 No No Non-Granger Causality 
1 First difference of a variable is denoted by placing a "d" at the beginning of the variable label . Statistical 
analysis was conducted using RATS (Version 7: 20 1 0). 
Note: Number of observations=4 l 0, a single asterisk (*), and double asterisks (**) denote statistical 
significance at 0. 10  and 0.0 1 level, respectively. 
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